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UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
No writer could reasonably challenge the soundness of the court's
position in the instant case. When an arm of the government seeks to
take a man's property, every protection should be afforded the citizen
so that he is fairly compensated. Chicone provides just that protection
through a rule which assures that equity will be done. The law of Florida
now fully protects all property owners who are confronted with eminent
domain proceedings. To achieve. a position closer to perfection in this
area, only one step remains-the adoption of the corollary to the Chicone
rule; that is, complete adoption of the Maryland rule so that the owner
neither loses in the event of depreciation nor gains in the event of appre-
ciation. This type of transition would not only protect the condemnee,
but would also ensure that public funds would be fairly and prudently
disbursed.
NATHANIEL E. GOZANSKY
PROBATE-DISCOVERY AVAILABLE IN WILL CONTESTS
The daughter of the testator renounced the ten dollars awarded her
under the will in probate, and filed a petition for revocation of probate of
the will, alleging the lack of mental capacity of the testator and undue
influence. Prior to the trial the petitioner attempted to use certain
discovery devices by serving the respondent-executors with requests for
admissions, interrogatories, a notice for taking depositions, and a motion
for production of documents. The objections of the respondent-executors
were sustained and discovery was denied on the ground that the Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure were inapplicable to a proceeding of this nature.
By certiorari review of the interlocutory order, held, order quashed: a
will contest is both a civil action and a special proceeding in the county
judge's court, and when filed within a probate proceeding, the parties
are entitled to the use of discovery devices provided for in the Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure. Estes v. Estes, 158 So.2d 794 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1963).
A "will contest" is a legal proceeding brought for the purpose of
determining whether or not a will is valid.' At the time that the right to
devise realty by will was first conferred, it was not possible to contest a
testamentary disposition2 since there were no proceedings available to
probate a will devising real property.' On the death of the testator the
devisee under the will took possession of the land. Anyone who desired
1. E.g., McCrary v. Michael, 109 S.W.2d 50 (Mo. App. 1937); Smith v. Negley,
304 S.W.2d 464 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
2. Campbell v. Porter, 162 U.S. 478 (1896); In re Dana, 138 Fla. 676, 190 So. 52
(1938); In re Duffy, 228 Iowa 426, 292 N.W. 165 (1940); In re Noble, 338 Pa. 490,
13 A.2d 422 (1940).
3. In re Duffy, supra note 2.
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to challenge his right to possession could bring an action of partition,
ejectment, writ of right,4 or other proceedings.' The devisee could defend
his possession by asserting that the will was a "muniment of title." It was
possible, however, that in an action of ejectment, the devisee's right to
possession by virtue of the will could be sustained, and, in a subsequent
action brought by a different person, the will which devised the property
could be held invalid. This lack of definiteness caused to be recognized
the necessity for remedial action.
Statutory regulation came in 1857 and filled this gap concerning
proof, disproof and revocation of wills.7 Other statutory regulation ap-
peared in the United States, giving a prima facie status to any will once
admitted to probate.8 Today's will contest originated by statute,9 which
is now the exclusive method for setting aside a will. 10 If a party seeks to
revoke the probate, the burden rests upon him to allege and prove facts
sufficient to warrant revocation. 1 This action is a new and independent
substantive right,' 2 but because it is in derogation of the common law, it
must be strictly construed.' 3
The majority of states wherein the problem providing for the right
to contest a will has been presented hold that a will contest is a civil
action.'" A "civil action" is generally defined as an ordinary proceeding
in a court of justice by one party against another for the enforcement of
4. Green v. Liter, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 229 (1814).
5. In re Duffy, supra note 2.
6. In re Baker, 170 Cal. 578, 585, 150 Pac. 989, 992 (1915).
7. Probate Act of 1857, 20 & 21 Vict., c. 77.
8. Tompkins v. Tompkins, 24 Fed. Cas. 40 (No. 14091) (C.C.D. R.I. 1841). See also
Strickland v. Peters, 120 F.2d 53 (5th Cir. 1941).
9. E.g., In re Walter, 89 Cal. App. 2d 797, 202 P.2d 89 (1949); State ex rel. Ashby v.
Haddock, 140 So.2d 631 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962); Ptaszek v. Konczal, 7 Ill. 2d 145, 130
N.E.2d 257 (1955); Dodge v. Detroit Trust Co., 300 Mich. 575, 2 N.W.2d 509 (1942);
Stitt v. Cox, 52 N.M. 24, 190 P.2d 434 (1948); Peters v. Moore, 154 Ohio St. 177, 93
N.E.2d 683 (1950); In re Kane, 20 Wash. 2d 76, 145 P.2d 893 (1944).
10. E.g., Yung v. Peloquin, 6 Ill. App. 2d 258, 127 N.E.2d 252 (1955); State ex tel.
Wilson v. Howard Circuit Court, 237 Ind. 263, 145 N.E.2d 4 (1957); In re Meredith,
275 Mich. 278, 266 N.W. 351 (1936); Campbell v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 346 Mo.
200, 139 S.W.2d 935 (1940); Stitt v. Cox, 52 N.M. 24, 190 P.2d 434 (1948); In re Puett,
229 N.C. 8, 47 S.E.2d 488 (1948); Gravier v. Gluth, 163 Ohio St. 232, 126 N.E.2d
332 (1955).
11. Barry v. Walker, 103 Fla. 533, 137 So. 711 (1931).
12. E.g., In re Walter, 89 Cal. App. 2d 797, 202 P.2d 89 (1949); In re Martinez,
47 N.M. 6, 132 P.2d 422 (1942) ; Leathers v. Binkley, 196 Tenn. 80, 264 S.W.2d 561 (1954).
13. E.g., State ex rel. Ashby v. Haddock, 140 So.2d 631 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962); Braeuel
v. Reuther, 270 Mo. 603, 193 S.W. 283 (1917); Stitt v. Cox, 52 N.M. 24, 190 P.2d 434
(1948); In re Elliott, 22 Wash. 2d 334, 156 P.2d 427 (1945).
14. O'Day v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 2d 540, 116 P.2d 621 (1941); Simpson v.
Simpson, 273 Ill. 90, 112 N.E. 276 (1916); Fort v. White, 54 Ind. App. 210, 101 N.E.
27 (1913); McFadden v. McFadden, 179 Kan. 455, 296 P.2d 1098 (1956); Callaway v.
Blankenbaker, 346 Mo. 383, 141 S.W.2d 810 (1940); In re Blake, 33 N.J. Super. 229,
109 A.2d 705 (P. Ct. 1954); In re Morrow, 41 N.M. 723, 73 P.2d 1360 (1937); People
ex rel. Lewis v. Fowler, 229 N.Y. 84, 127 N.E. 793 (1920); Hymel v. Bing, 67 Ohio App.
432, 31 N.E.2d 112 (1940); In re Swan, 4 Utah 2d 277, 293 P.2d 682 (1956).
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a private right or the redress or prevention of a private wrong.15 Inherent
in a civil action is the concept of an adversary proceeding. In a will
contest, this spirit of adversity is present since each person contesting
the will has a claim antagonistic to all others and the claims of others are
antagonistic to his interests. 16 Some courts have held that once adverse
claims are asserted the action emerges as an independent,' self-sustaining
civil action, and by statute, the parties are entitled to all the rights of an
ordinary jury trial.'8 Therefore, once a will contest is classified as a civil
action either by virtue of its nature, 19 or specifically by statute,2" it
comes within the purview of rules of civil procedure,2' including all
those rules in the area of discovery.
The United States Supreme Court has taken the lead in expanding
the rules of civil procedure for federal courts,22 and state supreme courts
generally have followed suit. Today the policy of the federal and state
courts is towards great liberality in the interpretation and application
of the rules, especially with regard to those concerning discovery.2 3 In
any judicial proceeding the purpose of the pre-trial discovery devices is
to encourage the fullest presentation of the facts, minimize the intro-
duction of falsified evidence, and to eliminate the formal fictions of trial
by combat.2 4 One court explained that our modern devices are "intended
to facilitate discovery, not to stimulate the ingenuity of lawyers and
judges to make the pursuit of discovery an obstacle race."26
The minority of those states specifically dealing with the right to
contest the probate of a will, however, refuse to classify a will contest
as a civil action, 26 and therefore, hold that the rules of civil procedure
are inapplicable. Those jurisdictions distinguish the proceeding as "a
15. See Lee v. Lang, 140 Fla. 782, 192 So. 490 (1940).
16. In re Friedman, 173 Cal. 411, 413, 160 Pac. 237, 238 (1916): "His hand will be
against every man, and every man's hand against him."
17. In re Martinez, 47 N.M. 6, 132 P.2d 422 (1942).
18. People ex rel. Lewis v. Fowler, 229 N.Y. 84, 127 N.E. 793 (1920).
19. See note 16 supra.
20. E.g., Evans v. Evans, 109 Kan. 608, 201 Pac. 60 (1921); Clark v. McFarland,
99 Ohio St. 100, 124 N.E. 164 (1918).
21. The inherent purpose of both the federal and state rules of civil procedure is
to formulate rules of practice and procedure for all suits of a civil nature. E.g., Intro-
duction, FLA. R. Cirv. P.
22. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were expanded through amendments adopted
by the United States Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1958), as amended, 28 U.S.C. §
2072 (Supp. IV, 1963).
23. E.g., United States v. Carter, 15 F.R.D. 367 (D.D.C. 1954); Paley v. Superior
Court, 137 Cal. App. 2d 450, 290 P.2d 617 (1955); Reeves v. Penaluna, 66 N.W.2d 864
(Iowa 1954) ; Drake v. Bowles, 97 N.H. 471, 92 A.2d 161 (1952).
24. State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881 (1953).
25. Barnes v. Lednum, 197 Md. 398, 406, 79 A.2d 520, 524 (1951).
26. Nelson v. Cowling, 89 Ark. 334, 116 S.W. 890 (1909); Henry v. Spurlin, 277 Ky.
114, 125 S.W.2d 992 (1939); Brissie v. Craig, 232 N.C. 701, 62 S.E.2d 330 (1950); In re
Noble, 338 Pa. 490, 13 A.2d 422 (1940) ; In re Golder, 37 S.D. 397, 158 N.W. 734 (1916)
Jones v. Witherspoon, 182 Tenn. 498, 187 S.W.2d 788 (1945).
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special action,"27 a "proceeding in rem,"" "sui generis,"'29 or "a judicial
inquiry. ' 30 Speaking for the minority position, South Dakota3 reasons
that a petition to probate a will originates as a "special proceeding,"
and that the subsequent filing to contest the probate does not change the
nature of the proceeding. The will contest is entitled, "In the matter of
the estate of" the deceased. All the vitality and origin of the revocation
proceeding is conceived in the original petition to probate the will and
the statutory provisions governing the proceedings. Therefore, a will
contest is not converted into a civil action, but retains the nature of a
special proceeding.32
In the instant case, the Florida Third District Court of Appeal
followed the majority position and held that a will contest is a civil
action. The court delineated the adversary nature of the action as a
decisive factor, as well as the ability of the action to stand independently..
In Florida, a petition to revoke a will "would be filed by separate suit."3 "
For example, provisions are made for revocation of probate after settle-
ment of the estate, if a second will is discovered within three years after
the probate proceedings are closed, which expressly or impliedly re-
vokes the first. 4 However, when the petition for revocation is filed during
the pendency of a probate proceeding, the statute directs that it be filed
within the existing probate action.35 A proceeding for revocation of pro-
bate retains its basic characteristic as a separate action and is no less
a civil action, regulated by the rules of procedure, merely because filed
in probate when the conditions so require.
To determine the scope of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure the
court sought support on two grounds. In the first place, the introduction
to the rules states that the rules are intended "to govern all suits of a
'civil nature and all special statutory proceedings of . . . the County
Judge's Court."36 Furthermore, the Florida Legislature has expressly
indicated that "in all civil matters ... the rules of practice and pleading
in [the County Judge's Court] . . . shall be the Florida rules of civil
27. Nelson v. Cowling, 89 Ark. 334, 116 S.W. 890 (1909); In re Golder, 37 S.D. 397,
158 N.W. 734 (1916).
28. Brissie v. Craig, 232 N.C. 701, 62 S.E.2d 330 (1950).
29. Jones v. Witherspoon, 182 Tenn. 498, 187 S.W.2d 788 (1945).
30. Henry v. Spurlin, 277 Ky. 114, 125 S.W.2d 992 (1939).
31. In re Golder, 37 S.D. 397, 158 N.W. 734 (1916).
32. Ibid. The South Dakota decision cited to In re Joseph, 118 Cal. 660, 50 Pac. 768
(1897), to explain its rationale. Since the time of the South Dakota case, however, it
should be noted that California has changed its position and now holds a will contest to be
a civil action. See note 14 supra.
33. Estes v. Estes, 158 So.2d 794, 796 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
34. FLA. STAT. §§ 732.32-.33 (1963).
35. FLA. STAT. § 732.30 (1963).
36. Introduction, FLA. R. Civ. P. (Emphasis added.) The Florida Rules of Civil Proce-
dure were drafted and are regulated by the state supreme court, acting pursuant to the
power vested under the Florida Constitution of 1885. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3.
1964]
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procedure as may now and hereafter be adopted by the supreme court. '3 7
Secondly, the Estes court fortified its holding by classifying a will con-
test as "a special statutory proceeding.""8 Inasmuch as Rule A of the
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure expressly states that these rules should
apply to "all special statutory proceedings in ... County Judge's Courts,"
it would appear thereafter, that the decision could be supported by this
language alone.
Whether a will contest be classified a civil action or a special statu-
tory proceeding, the Rules of Civil Procedure promulgated by the
supreme court, including the rules of discovery in this area of probate,
are fully applicable. The court indicated that it was, therefore, im-
material whether the action ig claggified ag in rem or in personam. 9
Equally meaningless in this inquiry is the technical division of the Florida
Rules into parts B, C, and D, since discovery is equally available in
all parts. °
A caveat may be in order concerning the breadth of the instant
decision. The Estes case in no way enlarges the statutory qualifications
which permit one to contest the probate of a will. The obvious reason
for limitations is to prevent a decedent's estate from being subjected to
time-consuming litigation by non-interested parties. Requisite interest
in the estate is an essential condition to the right to litigate. To qualify
under section 732.30 of the Florida Statutes one still must qualify, with
certain exceptions,4 ' either as an heir, a distributee of the estate of the
decedent, or as a legatee or devisee under a former will.42
Concerning statutory construction as to "interested parties," a
divergence of views exists between the First: and Third District Courts
of Appeal in Florida. The First District has taken a position "to broaden
rather than restrict the definition of those entitled to contest the probate
of an alleged will."4 This liberality concerning parties who have standing
to contest a will "is an inherited tradition of great antiquity."44 A more
37. FLA. STAT. § 36.09 (1963). The Florida Statutes also state that all rules of civil
procedure shall supersede conflicting rules and statutes. FLA. STAT. § 25.371 (1963).
38. 158 So.2d 794, 797 (1963).
39. Ibid. Previously a will contest in Florida was a proceeding in rem. Gardiner v.
Goertner, 110 Fla. 377, 149 So. 186 (1933).
40. Estes v. Estes, 158 So.2d 794, 796 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
41. The only exceptions where one may not qualify under the statutory requirements
are where a statutory "real party in interest," under section 732.30 of the Florida Statutes:
(1) has notice of probate and does not contest within the time allowed, FLA. STAT. § 732.30(1)
(1963); (2) has waived the probate proceeding, FLA. STAT. § 732.28(5) (1963) ; or, (3) is
barred by the special caveat proceedings, FLA. STAT. § 732.30(1) (1963).
42. FLA. STAT. § 732.32 (1963).
43. State ex rel. Ashby v. Haddock, 140 So.2d 631, 636 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962). To
support its liberal interpretation of the statute, the court held that "(the statute) is to be
strictly construed to the end that persons entitled may not be summarily deprived of an
opportunity to establish their interest in an estate and, by the same token, in order that
the intentions of the testator be not frustrated." Ibid.
44. Id. at 636.
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contemporary reason for the liberality is the present trend towards the
creation of destructive trusts.45
On the other hand, in the Third District Court of Appeal case of
Yarmark v. Botsikas," the court insisted on a narrow, literal reading of
the statute and discovery was denied to the prospective claimants. It
is interesting to note that Yarmark was decided on the same day as the
Estes case, by a bench which included two of the same judges. The
facts showed that the claimant petitioned the estate for production of
documents concerning its assets. The district court of appeal quashed
the order of the county judge's court which had allowed production,
because the claimants were not within those statutory classifications
granted standing in an order for production. The cases are distinguish-
able in several respects. In the first place, the claimants in Yarmark
were not contesting a will as statutory "real parties in interest," under
section 732.30 of the Florida Statutes. Rather, they were petitioning
under section 733.51 to determine the assets of the estate, both to facili-
tate the preparation and filing of their claim against the estate and to
assure the safekeeping of the assets in the hands of the administratrix.
Secondly, the petitioners in Yarmark had no interest under the will,
either as legatees, creditors, distributees, devisees, or heirs at law, as
contrasted with the daughter's status as heiress in Estes. Thus, the
Yarmark decision is not inconsistent with Estes in that discovery in
the two cases was sought for different reasons, under different statutes,
and by different persons.
It would seem that the Estes court also might have based its
decision on the authority of section 732.13 of the Florida Statutes,
which provides that depositions de bene esse may be taken in probate
in the manner provided under Rule 1.32 of the Florida Rules of Civil
Procedure. However, Rule 1.32 was abolished in 1961 and the present
rule no longer provides for de bene esse depositions. It is submitted,
therefore, that the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure have retained no
distinction between the general "discovery" depositions and "de bene
esse" depositions, and depositions should now be able to be taken in
probate proceedings in the same manner as provided for in the rules.
One unanswered question remains as to the full extent of the ap-
plicability of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure to will contests. Even
though the federal courts have abolished almost all distinctions between
common law and equity for pleading purposes, Florida has retained the
distinction. Perhaps the will contest will first of necessity be characterized
as equitable, according to the basic nature of the action of revocation
sought, in order to ascertain which parts of the rules apply. Or, itmay
45. Ibid.
46. 158 So.2d 770 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
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be that this statutory "civil action" will also be entitled to the rules of
civil procedure on the law side, such as trial by jury. Generally, those
states making a will contest a common law action confer jurisdiction on
the common law courts by statute." Thus, in the absence of statute in
Florida, the action will probably be initially characterized as equitable.
Though the instant case is one of first impression in Florida, it
has solid support by foreign case law and by Florida statutory con-
struction. It should serve to establish new guideposts for proceedings
in probate courts within the Third District Court of Appeal's jurisdiction
-an area which formerly was noted for its lack of uniformity from
county to county.48 The utopian situation, however, can only be reached
by state-wide uniformity in this area.
CHARLES 0. MORGAN, JR.
INCOME TAX-EMPLOYEE'S REIMBURSEMENT FOR LOSS
ON SALE OF RESIDENCE
The petitioner accepted new employment which required that he
move to a distant city. His family remained to attend to the sale of
their residence. It became apparent, however, that the house could not
be sold at its appraised value. When the new employer realized that
this situation was interfering with the employee's performance, he offered
to reimburse him for the difference between the appraised value of the
home and the amount realized from the sale. Pursuant to the employer's
offer, the employee received a reimbursement of five thousand dollars,
which he failed to include in his reported income. The Tax Court held that
the amount was compensation for services and consequently taxable in-
come to the taxpayer.' On appeal, held, affirmed: a payment which con-
stitutes an economic benefit to the taxpayer which arises out of his
employment is to be treated as compensation for services. Bradley v.
Commissioner, 324 F.2d 610 (4th Cir. 1963).
The Internal Revenue Code defines "gross income" as "all income
from whatever source derived."2 The code uses three categories to afford
47. Statutes in some states providing for a will contest make it a common law action,
conferring jurisdiction on the common law courts. Miles v. Long, 342 Ill. 589, 174 N.E. 836
(1931); Dean v. Swayne, 67 Kan. 241, 72 Pac. 780 (1903); Hans v. Holler, 165 Mo. 47,
65 S.W. 308 (1901); People ex rel. Lewis v. Fowler, 229 N.Y. 84, 127 N.E. 793 (1920);
3 PAGE, WILLS § 26.50 (3d ed. 1961).
48. BROOKER, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN THE COUNTY JUDGE'S COURT OF HILLS-
BOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA (2d ed. 1954).
1. Harris W. Bradley, 39 T.C. 652 (1963).
2. "Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross income means all income
from whatever source derived . . . ." INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 61(a).
[VOL. XVIII
